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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 10-4756 
_____________ 
 
SESCO ENTERPRISES,  LLC 
By and Through Michael Schubiger, its Tax Matters Partner, 
                                  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
______________ 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY  
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 3:10-cv-01470)  
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
______________ 
 
Argued September 21, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 7, 2011) 
______________ 
OPINION 
______________ 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant, SESCO Enterprises, LLC (“SESCO”), through its tax matters partner, 
Michael Schubiger, seeks reversal of the District Court’s decision to grant a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellee, United States (“the Government”).  For 
the reasons stated herein, we will vacate the District Court’s Order.   
     
I.  BACKGROUND 
We recite the pertinent facts primarily for the benefit of the parties.  Appellant, 
SESCO, trades in electricity futures contracts on marketplaces (“exchanges”) regulated 
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).  In tax years 2004 and 2005, 
SESCO filed tax returns claiming favorable tax treatment for profits stemming from these 
trades.  The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) audited SESCO and adjusted the 
company’s tax filings on the ground that the FERC-regulated exchanges did not qualify 
for favorable tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. § 1256.   
SESCO filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
challenging the IRS’s adjustments pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6226. In Counts One and Two 
of the complaint (one relating to each tax return), SESCO asserted that the IRS acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion when it adjusted SESCO’s tax 
filings without making a qualified board or exchange (“QBE”) determination regarding 
the FERC-regulated exchanges on which it trades.  Count Three then alleged that the IRS 
failed to follow certain procedural requirements in conducting Appellant’s audit and 
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appeal in violation of a Treasury Regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 601.106(f)(9)(iii), and two 
Revenue Procedures, Rev. Proc. 2010-2 and 2000-43.  This opinion addresses only 
SESCO’s claims regarding the IRS’s adjustment of its tax filings (i.e., Counts One and 
Two), as SESCO has not appealed the District Court’s findings on Count Three.   
The District Court dismissed the case on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IRS’s adjustment of SESCO’s 2004 
and 2005 tax filings.  Specifically, the Court ruled that it could not review the IRS’s 
adjustments to Appellant’s tax filings because there was no law for it to apply to decide 
whether the IRS properly declined to make a QBE determination regarding the FERC-
regulated exchanges.   
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had original jurisdiction over the underlying case, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal from a final order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
“Our scope of review of the district court’s decision on” whether “judicial review 
was . . . available pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)” and whether the agency action was 
not “in accordance with law . . . is plenary.”  Raymond Proffitt Found. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs., 343 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Davis Enters. v. U.S. E.P.A., 
877 F.2d 1181, 1184 (3d Cir. 1989) (omission in original)). 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 The District Court granted the Government’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings because “there [was] no law to apply, and the clear and convincing evidence 
shows a legislative intent to preclude judicial review.”  App. 07.  After announcing this 
holding, the District Court concluded that it “[did] not have jurisdiction to hear Counts 
One and Two of the Petition.”  Id.  Without addressing the substantive arguments posited 
by each party, we vacate the District Court’s Order and hold that it does have jurisdiction 
over this matter pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6226.      
Federal appellate courts have an obligation to inquire into their own jurisdiction 
and that of the district court.  Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2003);  
FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990) (We review our subject 
matter jurisdiction over the matter “even if the courts below have not passed on it, and 
even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us.”) (internal citation omitted).  In its 
petition before the District Court, Appellant sought relief from the IRS’s adjustments to 
its 2004 and 2005 tax returns, under 26 U.S.C. § 6226.  Specifically, SESCO claimed that 
the IRS erroneously adjusted lines 8 and 11 of Schedule K of both its 2004 and 2005 tax 
returns.  The District Court, focusing on the substantive QBE determinations (or lack 
thereof) underlying the IRS’s adjustment decisions, concluded that it “lacked jurisdiction 
to hear Counts One and Two of the Petition.”  App. 07.   
Title 26 U.S.C. § 6226 provides tax filers with a right to be heard in appealing IRS 
adjustments of this nature; therefore, we must begin our analysis with the statute.  We 
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find that the District Court’s conclusion contravenes the plain language of  26 U.S.C. § 
6226.  Title 26, United States Code Section 6226 states,  
“[w]ithin 90 days after the day on which a notice of a final partnership 
administrative adjustment is mailed to the tax matters partner, the tax 
matters partner may file a petition for a readjustment of the partnership 
items for such taxable year with . . . the district court of the United States 
for the district in which the partnership’s principal place of business is 
located.” 
 
The plain language of the statute authorizes a tax matters partner, such as Mr. Schubiger 
on behalf of SESCO, to file a petition for readjustment, such as the one at issue here, in 
the district court where its principal place of business is located.  It, therefore, gives the 
district court jurisdiction to resolve the disputes in the petition.
1
      
 We hold that 26 U.S.C. § 6226 firmly establishes jurisdiction for the District Court 
to adjudicate Counts One and Two of Appellant’s petition for readjustment.  We make no 
judgment regarding the District Court’s substantive analysis and vacate and remand only 
on the Court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.  Consequently, we 
reserve for the District Court to determine, in the first instance, any relevant factual and 
legal analysis regarding the substantive issues underlying the IRS’s adjustments.   
 
                                                     
1
 We note, parenthetically, that the Government does not assert that the District of New 
Jersey is an improper venue, nor does it allege that SESCO’s tax matters partner failed to 
file such petition within the allotted timeframe. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 We find that the District Court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction 
to hear Counts One and Two of Appellant’s petition for readjustment.  We will vacate the 
District Court’s Order granting the Government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 
and will remand this matter for further consideration by the District Court, consistent 
with this Opinion.  
 
 
